Battle Of Gettysburg
July 1-3, 1863
Union victory, Maj. General George G. Meade versus General Robert E. Lee.
Forces Engaged: 158,300 total - US 83,289 and CS 75,054.
Estimated Casualties: 51,000 total US 23,000 and CS 28,000.
Stuart, in command of the cavalry, had been left to observe the enemy,
with orders to cross the river and place himself on Ewell's right as soon as
possible after the National army should have left Virginia. Some discretion was
given to him, however, and in the exercise of it he made a successful march
around the National army, but meantime left Lee without cavalry in an enemy's
country, and without that information of the enemy's movements which was
indispensable to the wise ordering of his own. Moreover, Stuart's absence misled
Lee. Confident that his cavalry commander, who was a marvel of alertness and
promptitude, would not delay to join him after the passage of the river by the
adversary, Lee argued from his absence that the main body of the enemy was still
south of the river, and perhaps planning a counter-operation against Richmond,
while in fact the entire army under Meade was hastening toward Gettysburg, where
Lee encountered its advance on 1 July, unexpectedly and under a complete
misapprehension as to its strength, which constituted Lee's advance, met the
enemy first, and was directed to ascertain his strength, with orders to avoid a
general engagement if he should find anything more than cavalry present. He then
undertook to feel of the force in his front, and, as it consisted of infantry
and artillery in large bodies, he was soon hotly engaged in spite of his
endeavor to confine his operation to a reconnaissance. When Lee arrived on the
field, it was evident that a general engagement was not to be avoided, and he
ordered up such re-enforcements as were at hand, at the same time sending
directions for the remainder of his forces to hasten forward. Two divisions of
Hill's corps and two of Ewell's were brought into action, and during the
afternoon, after a sharp contest, the enemy was driven to a position south of
the town, where he occupied a line of hills and awaited a renewal of the attack.
.
In the absence of his cavalry, Lee was without any other information as to
the strength or the purposes of his enemy than that which he could get from the
prisoners taken, from whom he learned that Meade's entire army was approaching.
It was important, if possible, to seize the position held by the enemy before
further bodies of Meade's troops should arrive, as the line of hills afforded
many advantages to the commander who could occupy it, and Lee directed Ewell to
gain possession of it if possible, leaving him certain discretion, however, in
the exercise of which Ewell delayed the attempt, to await the arrival of his
remaining division, and so the opportunity was lost. It was Lee's intention to
attack with his whole available force on the morning of the 2d, but it was not
until late in the afternoon that Longstreet, whose troops had been some miles in
the rear, was ready to bear his important part in the assault, and in the mean
time the greater part of Meade's force had arrived and taken position. The
assault was made at four o'clock, with Ewell on the left, Hill in the centre,
and Longstreet on the right. The plan was for Longstreet to carry the position
occupied by the enemy's left, Ewell and Hill making demonstrations on the left
and centre, but converting their operations into a real attack should it appear
that troops from their front were withdrawn to aid in opposing Longstreet. This
was done, and a part of the enemy's works was carried by the Confederate left,
but relinquished because of Rhodes's inability to render support to Early as
promptly as had been intended. Meantime Longstreet had forced back the enemy's
left for some distance, and gained a favorable position for further operations.
The day came to an end with no decisive result, but Lee was encouraged to
believe that by a carefully concerted assault on the next day he might win a
victory that would go far to decide the issue of the war in favor of the
Confederates, or at any rate to compensate for the continued disasters suffered
by the Confederate arms in the west, and perhaps compel the withdrawal of the
National forces from that quarter for the defense of the middle and eastern
states. The value of such a victory, if he could achieve it, would be
incalculable, and, as Longstreet has declared, the army under Lee's command at
that time "was in condition to undertake anything."
It was therefore decided to make a supreme effort on the next day to carry
the enemy's position and put him to rout. Longstreet, strengthened by three
brigades under Pickett, and additionally re-enforced from Hill's corps, was to
make the main assault upon the enemy's right, while Ewell should attack his left
and Hill menace his centre. There was some slight miscarriage in preparation,
however, which resulted in Ewell's becoming engaged before Longstreet advanced
to the assault. Moreover, for reasons that have since been the subject of
somewhat acrimonious controversy, and the discussion of which would be
manifestly improper in this place, Longstreet's attack was not made with his
entire force, as had been intended; and although by that charge, which has
become historically famous as perhaps the most brilliant feat of arms performed
by Confederates on any field, Pickett's division succeeded in carrying the hill
in their front and entering the enemy's lines, it was left without adequate
support and was quickly hurled back, broken, and almost annihilated. This in
effect ended the battle of Gettysburg. As at Antietam, so on this field, no
decisive victory had been won by either army, but Lee's supreme effort had ended
in a repulse, and the advantage rested with the National arms. "It is
with an invading army as with an insurrection: an indecisive action is
equivalent to a defeat."
Biographies of Participants
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